As Uttar Pradesh heads towards the 2027 Assembly elections, the monolithic idea of OBC politics has collapsed. The real contest now lies in the intricate sub-categorization of 79 Yadav and non-Yadav castes, their quest for proportionate representation, and their shifting party alignments between Samajwadi Party’s PDA strategy and BJP’s non-Yadav consolidation.
Uttar Pradesh does not vote as OBCs. It votes as Yadavs, Kurmis, Lodhs, Nishads, Mauryas, Kushwahas, Sainthwars, Rajbhars, and dozens of other communities whose social histories, economic status and political memories are radically different. For three decades, the Mandal moment created an illusion of a unified backward class bloc. That illusion has shattered. In the run-up to the 2027 Assembly elections, Uttar Pradesh is witnessing the most intense micro-mobilization of OBC sub-groups ever seen. At the heart of this churn are two unresolved questions: Who represents whom within the backward classes, and which party can credibly promise that representation will translate into tickets, ministerial berths, police stations, universities and panchayat funds.
The numbers explain the urgency. OBCs constitute an estimated 52 to 55 percent of Uttar Pradesh’s population, according to multiple caste surveys and the 1931 Census extrapolation adjusted with National Sample Survey and contemporary state panel data. Yet within this massive 12 crore-plus population, power has always been concentrated. Samajwadi Party (SP) has built its core around Yadavs, who are about 9-11 percent of the state’s population but over 19 percent of the OBC population. Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), since 2014, has reversed the equation by consolidating non-Yadav OBCs, particularly Kurmis (4 percent), Lodhs (2.8 percent), and a constellation of Most Backward Classes (MBCs) like Nishad, Bind, Kewat, Mallah, Rajbhar, Prajapati, Pal, Gadariya, Saini, Maurya, Shakya, and Chauhan. The Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), once a Dalit-Brahmin-OBC experiment, is now struggling to retain its Kurmi-Maurya base. Congress, through its OBC outreach, is attempting a revival but lacks organizati
This analysis maps the anatomy of UP’s OBC politics along three axes: the internal hierarchy of sub-groups, the reality of political representation beyond symbolism, and the evolving party alignment that will decide 2027.
The Arithmetic of Backwardness: Understanding UP’s Sub-Group Pyramid
The UP State Backward Class Commission lists 79 castes under OBC. This is not a homogeneous list. Sociologists and political analysts divide them into three broad layers for analytical clarity.
First, the Upper OBCs or Dominant OBCs: Yadav, Kurmi (including Patel, Kurmi-Sainthwar, Kurmi-Patanwar), and Lodh (including Lodhi-Rajput). These three groups own land, have relatively higher literacy, dominate cooperative societies, and have produced MLAs for 40 years. They alone account for nearly 30-32 percent of the OBC population.
Second, the Lower OBCs or Intermediate Backward Castes: Jat in Western UP (though centrally OBC in UP), Gujjar, Maurya, Kushwaha, Shakya, Saini, Mali, Koeri. This layer is agrarian but less landed than the first, increasingly moving to small enterprise, transport and horticulture, and highly aspirational.
Third, the Most Backward Classes (MBCs) or Ati-Pichhda: This is the largest and most fragmented layer, estimated at over 35 individual castes and at least 50 percent of the OBC population. This includes Nishad (including Mallah, Kewat, Bind, Kashyap, Dhimar), Rajbhar, Pal (Gadaria), Prajapati (Kumhar), Vishwakarma (Lohar, Badhai), Chauhan (Lonia), Nai, Teli, Chaurasia, Kahar, and others. This group is largely landless, dependent on traditional occupations, seasonal migration, and MNREGA, and has historically had the lowest representation.
The critical political story of the last ten years is that this third layer has become electorally self-conscious. The Rohini Commission’s proposal for sub-categorization of OBC reservation at the central level — dividing OBC quota into 40 percent for dominant OBCs, 35 percent for intermediate, and 25 percent for most backward or even further — has reached every chai shop in Purvanchal. Even though Uttar Pradesh has not yet implemented sub-categorization for state jobs, the idea has created a powerful psychological framework. Most backward communities now argue that Yadavs and Kurmis have cornered the quota. Data from UP Public Service Commission selections and police recruitment between 2015-2023, as accessed through RTI, shows disproportionate selection from five castes.
The Big Three: Yadav, Kurmi and Lodh — Dominance, Anxiety and Divergence
Yadavs remain the most politically organized OBC group. In SP, Yadavs constituted 28 of its 111 MLAs in 2022, despite being only one caste. Their organizational hold over district presidents, youth wings and cooperative banks remains formidable. For SP chief Akhilesh Yadav, the challenge is to retain Yadav loyalty while proving that PDA — Picchda, Dalit, Alpasankhyak — is not a Yadav-centric project. Field reporting from Kannauj, Etawah, Mainpuri, Azamgarh and Gorakhpur shows Yadavs are still 85 percent aligned with SP, with a small but growing BJP Yadav wing in Ahirwal pockets of Aligarh and Sikandrabad influenced by central Yadav leaders.
Kurmis are the swing pivot of UP. Once divided between Congress and JD, they moved en masse to BSP in 2007, to SP in 2012, and to BJP since 2014, largely following Apna Dal (Soneylal) and its leader Anupriya Patel. Kurmi concentration in Kurmi belt — Phulpur, Allahabad, Barabanki, Lakhimpur, Bahraich, Mirzapur, Rohilkhand’s Bareilly-Pilibhit — makes them decisive in over 70 seats. However, Kurmi politics is not monolithic. Kurmi-Patel in central UP and Kurmi-Sainthwar in Purvanchal have different party preferences. Apna Dal (S) wins seats but faces anti-incumbency where Kurmi youth ask why sub-categorization is not being implemented. The Kurmi Mahasabha’s demand for a Deputy Chief Minister from Kurmi community has grown louder.
Lodhs, concentrated in Etah, Kasganj, Badaun, Bareilly, Farrukhabad and Bundelkhand’s Jhansi-Lalitpur belt, were historically with BJP due to Kalyan Singh’s legacy. The death of Kalyan Singh in 2021 created a vacuum. BJP tried to fill it with multiple Lodh faces but none with mass appeal. SP has consciously given tickets to Lodhs and even made a Lodh MLC. Lodhs remain largely with BJP (estimated 65 percent in 2022), but discontent over cane prices, representation in cabinet and local Thanas is visible. This anxiety is opening space for Congress and SP in Bundelkhand.
Non-Yadav OBCs and the MBC Upsurge: The Real Battleground of 2027
If 2022 was about non-Yadav OBC consolidation behind BJP, 2027 will be about fragmentation of that consolidation. The most important sub-group here is Nishad, numbering roughly 18 percent within OBC, or about 9-10 percent of UP’s population. Nishad Party led by Sanjay Nishad, allied with BJP, claims to represent all riverine communities. In seats around Gorakhpur, Bhadohi, Jaunpur, Prayagraj, and Machhlishahr, Nishads decide the result. Yet Nishad voters are split. Many feel that SC status demand was used only for votes. Ground interviews in Gorakhpur’s Sahjanwa and Allahabad’s Handia show that younger Nishad voters are asking for fishing rights, boat subsidies and sand mining licenses, not just symbolic inclusion. BJP’s 2024 Lok Sabha setback in seats like Ghazipur, Lalganj and Jaunpur was partly due to Nishad-Mallah alienation.
Rajbhars, led by Om Prakash Rajbhar’s Suheldev Bharatiya Samaj Party (SBSP), are concentrated in Purvanchal’s Ghosi, Mau, Ghazipur, Ballia, and Azamgarh, about 3.5-4 percent of OBC population. Rajbhar’s politics is a perfect case study of OBC sub-group bargaining. From 2017 BJP ally to 2022 SP ally to 2024 a
